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Principles of Railway Transportation. By Eliot Jones, Ph.D. New York, The
Macmillan Company, 1924. pp. viii, 6o7.
The title of this book, Principles of Railway Trasportation, does not indicate
with exactitude the character of the contents. A more accurate title would be a
history of railroad legislation and administrative control in the United States with
a discussion of certain American railroad problems and the inclusion of a summa-
rized theory of rates and rate-making. The space devoted to rates and rate-making
is less than one-fifth of the entire volume.
After a rather cursory appraisal of the economic importance of the railroad
industry, there follow: first, a so-called financial introduction descriptive of
various types of American railway securities; and second, an historical introduc-
tion explanatory of the growth of the American railway net, chiefly by decades
since 183o. This prefatory matter covering about 70 pages is clear, well
arranged and, so far as appears from examination, is accurate but not novel.
Part II, devoted to Rates and Rate-Making, is a presentation of the more or
less. conventional theory of railway rates, emphasizing such standpoints as increas-
ing returns, joint costs, constant costs and differential charging.
The author condemns differential charging, or "charging what the traffic will
bear," in the sense of "fixing the rate on each individual commodity at the point
that yields the maximum net profit" (p. 88). On the other hand, differential
charging, that is, the adjusting of charges on different commodities so as to obtain
the maximum utilization of the railway plant, is declared to be sound and in the
public interest. Passing over the author's assumption that railroad transportation
always presents a case of joint costs, and never one of alternative costs, the
criticism may be ventured that he does not live up rigorously to his own logic in
this matter of. differential charging.
So long as the maximum net monopoly profit on each commodity is avoided, Mr.
Jones approves charging more per Ioo pounds of silk than on ioo pounds of junk
for the same haul. The junk could not pay the silk rate; and so long as the junk
affords more than the'extra cost specifical'y incurred on account of the carriage
of the junk. the difference in charges, despite possible equality in costs, results in
more goods being transported and in a fuller utilization of the railroad plant. But
if, on this basis, silk may properly be charged more than junk, why may not local
non-competitive freight be charged on a higher level than competitive freight? If
the competitive freight were raised to the level of the local or non-competitive
freight, some of the competitive freight would not move. "Yet there is no reason
to believe that local discrimination causes the facilities of the carriers as a whole to
be more fully utilized..... .Low rates, of course, do increase the volume of
traffic, but discriminatory rates do not" (p. Iio). But discriminatory rates imply
the existence of low rates at preferred points; and, as the author says, "low rates,
of course, do increase the vQlume of traffic." It would seem if, from the same
point of origin, low rates on junk and high rates on silk tend to maximize the'
volume of freight carried, that on the same principle, low rates on competitive
freight and higher rates on non-competitive freight might also tend to maximize
the volume of traffic carried. Doubtless there may be a degree of local discrimina-
tion that is both economically unjustifiable as well as unlawful, but the trumpet in
the text gives forth an uncertain sound.
The treatment of personal discrimination leaves inuch to be desired. To sdy that
"if we really want to abolish the rebating evil, we shall undoubtedly have to
abolish private cars" (p. 123) does not carry any evidence of the knowledge that
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the mileage allowance on private cars is generally less than the interest, sometimes
less than the annual repairs, on these cars.
The discussion of Rate Systems is incomplete, and in parts erroneous. The omis-
sion of the Southwestern rate structure, and of the whole basis of Texas rates is
remarkable. The impression is certainly conveyed that in what is called The Trunk
Line Rate System there is no violation of the Fourth Section. We are strongly
of impression that even between Central Freight Territory and New York City
there are countless violations of the Fourth Section where certain indirect lines
pass through higher percentage groups in order to reach destinations in a lower
percentage group. There is no description in the text of the Rate System
applicable wholly within -what the author calls "eastern trunk line territory"
(P. 149). At the close of the discussion of the Transcontinenta4 Rate System
(p. 182) it is said:
"The long and short haul principle thus continues, as after 1918, to be
observed in transcontinental territory, though rates to the Pacific Coast
terminals from points east of the Missouri River are still blanketed as already
explained." "
This statement, taken in its context, seems unmistakably to imply that from the
Atlantic to the Missouri River, uniform rates prevail to the Pacific Coast terminals,
irrespective of the point of origin. If this be the interpretation put on the para-
graph, it is erroneous. It is true that the Pacific Coast terminals are generally
blanketed on traffic from the east. The rate from Cleveland to Portland or
San Francisco or Los Angeles would normally be the same. But it is not true
that the rate from Cleveland to the three terminals is the same as from New York
or from Chicago to the three terminals. On westbound transcontinental traffic the
territory on and east of the Missouri River is divided into ten groups known as
A,. B, C, D, E, F, K, L, M and N, the rates from which vary according to the
group; except that,' generally speaking, groups A and K .(Atlantic Seaboard),
take the same rates; groups B and L (Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Atlantal take the same
rates; and groups C and M (Cincinnati, Birmingham, Ala.) take the same rates.
The larger part of the work is a discussion of railroad legislation and adminis-
tration. While this part of the text is generally a useful, intelligent and well-
-balanced analysis, there are traces of its not being thoroughly'synchronized. It
reads as though written up on an annalistic basis, and then imperfectly connected
up at a later time by cross references and inserts.
Among the specific problems treated is the valuation of railroad property for
purposes of rate-making. The author is an advocate of original cost; and believes
that even though original cost as a fact cannot be ascertained, an estimate of
original cost of the property still in use is the best basis of valuation. Assuming
that in 1920 it was compatible with sound judgment to make needed additions, such
as equipment, to a railroad property, is the shipper to be held for a generation to
pay rates affording a return on box cars at $3,ooo a car, even though ten years
later the cost of the same car new is but $i,5oo? This does not seem quite self-
evident.
Perhaps the best chapter in the whole book is" that devoted to Government
Ownership and Operation. The various considerations, pro and colt, are fairly
and intelligently marshaled. They are tested discriminatingly and in the light of
the essentially relevant facts. No conclusion is reached, but the materials of an
enlightened judgment on the matter are so handsomely indicated that the discus-
sion is to be highly recommended. Perhaps no fairer delineation of the matter




Law and Morals. By Roscoe Pound. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina
Press, 1924. pp. iv, 156.
"A history of juristic thought in the last century must precede an effective
science of law for to-day." Thus the author's preface. In the present lectures
Dean Pound leads up to the thought of the historical, analytical, and metaphysical
schools with a summary of Western legal philosophy in the preceding centuries.'
He proceeds to a presentation and critique of the three schools named, comparing
and contrasting their views of the nature and growth of law, and indicating in
each case the incompleteness and implermanent character of the theories and their
adaptation to the legal conditions of their own day. The presentation of the
various views discussed is dispassionate, buttressed by ample citations, and
accompanied by useful illustrative quotations. At times, as with the historical
school's view of legal development as the unfolding of an idea, the author shows
laudable patience with a curiously unrealistic conception. In a number of places
the author's own philosophy of law is suggested, but nowhere developed. Refer-
ences are, however, made in appropriate places to the previous writings in which
his thought has been developed more fully. The book contains little not already
familiar to those who have followed the author's work, but is an excellent intro-
duction for others, and a useful handbook in any event.
As a discussion of the relation of law and morals, however, the reviewer finds
it lacking, and lacking in a serious matter. The nature of law is discussed at
length and with much care. But the nature of morals is hardly discussed at all.
The distinctions taken by various writers between the two are set forth, but only
incidentally. It is shown that the Sitte of German discussion differs in intent
from what we would speak of as morals. But what the author means by morals,
and the genesis and working of such morals as agencies of social control, are
passed over in silence. Yet this seems to the reviewer quite as difficult and
pressing a problem, and one to which the igth century made equally valuable
contribution. One gathers from the book that at all times to some extent, and
in periods of rapid legal growth to a particular extent, law borrows from morals
and gives legal sanction to norms and standards non-legal in their origin. These
latter, or various of them, are spoken of at times as ethical, at times as moral, at
times as customary. But to assume any definite meaning in any of these terms
seems quite as unwarranted as to assume a definite meaning in the term law,
before defining it. It should follow, and to this reviewer it did follow, that the
interest and value of the lectures do not lie in the light they shed upon their
titular subject.
The bibliography covers some thirty pages, to which must be added the author's
own works cited only in the footnotes. The references are to chapter and verse.
The range of.reading covered is amazing, and to the less learned, disheartening.
Most of the books or authors are concisely described or classified: Vinogradoff:
"Kantian"; Jellinek: "psychological, analytical, social-utilitarian"; Parsons:
"social-utilitarian, analytical." The classifications, so far as the reviewer had
background enough to check them up, were admirable. Almost too much so.
A perusal of the bibliography leaves one wondering whether so pretty an allign-
ment can do justice to stubbornly irregular facts.
Of the text, too, much the same may be said. Dean Pound is of those who
believe that scholarship and philosophy are wholly compatible with the making
of literature. We are not used to this in American law, and the unusual arouses
not only interest, but suspicion. The style is graceful; the argument flows
smoothly; the generalizations are exceedingly persuasive. The immediate reac-
tion is, that something must be wrong. In reading Holmes such suspicions are
quickly allayed by the discovery that the author's art is directed primarily to
stripping the husks off the issue under discussion. In reading Cardozo the
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suspicions die in proportion as one observes that the issue is narrow, and the
argument in large part a contribution from personal experience. But the sweep
of the present little volume is wide, and the generalizations far-reaching. In
this unlettered age the very neatness and finish of the writing must lead to hesita-
tion in accepting the conclusions. That is unfortunate. Art and truth not only
can, but should, be mated. But though distressful, such suspic! ins need not be
permanent. Where sound, conclusions will prove out as readers test them.
Meantime, Dean Pound has taken another step toward establishing an ideal much
to be desired: that scholars who learn to read should also learn to write.
K N. LLEWELLYN
Yale School of Law.
Handbook of the Law of Principal and Agent. By Francis B. Tiffany, Second
edition by Richard R. B. Powell. pp. xiii, 485. Illustrative Cases on Agency.
By Richard R. B. Powell. pp. x, 4o5. St. Paul, West Publishing Co., x924.
Although the Handbook, one of the Horn Book series, is issued as a second
edition of Tiffany, it is practically a new work. Professor Powell has succeeded
admirably in 'producing a succinct statement of principles and an analysis of the
subject which is particularly helpful where decisions are conflicting or the reason-
ing of the courts not satisfying. One does not have the feeling which frequently
comes after reading brief texts that the writer has stopped where the difficulties
begin. The text shows that the work done in the subject in recent years has
been assimilated, and the references in the notes to practically all of the law
review articles makes it of especial use to the student and that portion of the
profession which is willing to utilize them. The book can be heartily commended.
Perhaps only two matters call for especial comment One is the introduction
of the "Entrepreneur Theory," by which it is suggested that tort liability for the
act of a servant, as between two possible masters, be determined by finding
"whose work was being done" at the time of the injury instead of finding who
was in control, the test generally used. Aside from the question as to whether
the proposed test is more workable than the older one, depending as it'does upon
vague economic factors, it may be doubted if its label will recommend it to the
courts.
Great emphasis is placed upon the distinction between "power" and "authority."
This, I think, aids considerably in the exposition of the subject. Although the
distinction has always been made, the courts have used the two words more or
less interchangeably, and have used authority with a variety of meanings. It
would have added somewhat to clearness, for student use at least, if the author
had defined, as well as contrasted, them. In Section 17, for instance, headed:
"Ability of agent by his own conduct to enlarge his power to bind principal to
third party," it is not altogether certain as to what is meant by "power."
In the accompanying case book, intended for schools using the text and case
method, the cases are interesting and well balanced. The compiler has avoided
the temptation to unduly cut the cases in the interests of space saving. The
minuteness of the sections and the order of the cases are obviously the result
of the combination with the horn book.
Wi isx A. SEAvaY
Kansas University, School of Law
